Volume 26, Issue 4 (winter 2025)                   Advances in Cognitive Sciences 2025, 26(4): 1-9 | Back to browse issues page


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Lohrasbi A. Critique of the claim that personal identity does not matter in survival. Advances in Cognitive Sciences 2025; 26 (4) :1-9
URL: http://icssjournal.ir/article-1-1783-en.html
Assistant Professor of the University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran
Abstract:   (388 Views)
The problem of personal identity involves finding a criterion that explains how a person can survive over time. A direct relationship exists between personal identity and a person’s survival, as a person continues to exist by remaining the same individual despite changes rather than disappearing.
However, Derek Parfit considers personal identity to be unimportant for survival. He argues that we are not fundamentally or directly concerned about our future existence as a singular entity. Instead, what truly matters is that, in the future, there will be individuals who are related to us in some way—through what he calls the “R” relationship. This connection is formed through a series of psychological links, which can persist and connect us with these future individuals. According to many philosophers, personal identity is significant because it serves as the foundation for many other issues, including religious, moral, and legal matters. The concept of a person is deeply intertwined with assumptions about rights and duties, making its correct interpretation particularly important. For instance, without a clear understanding of what constitutes a person and their survival, it is challenging to take a clear stance on issues like abortion or euthanasia. However, Parfit challenges the traditional perspective by distinguishing these issues from personal survival. He argues that what truly matters is not the survival of the individual but the continuity of psychological connections. These include memory, beliefs, desires, and personality, which are essential. In his view, rather than preserving personal identity, these psychological links are the basis for addressing moral and legal concerns. The main criticism of Parfit’s argument is that it reverses the logical order of the discussion. Proponents of the simple theory of personal identity argue that personal identity should be the foundational principle. By establishing it as the basis, we can recognize the impossibility or inconsistency of some of Parfit’s assumptions. In other words, any assumption that undermines personal identity is fundamentally flawed and should be rejected.
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Type of Study: Research |
Received: 2025/04/27 | Accepted: 2025/04/27 | Published: 2025/04/27

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