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Volume 22, Issue 3 (Autumn 2020)
Advances in Cognitive Sciences 2020, 22(3): 105-113 |
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Delfani Y, Hemmatimoghaddam A, Mosmer R, Sadat Mansouri M. The Zombie conceivability argument: An ontological conclusion for phenomenal consciousness. Advances in Cognitive Sciences 2020; 22 (3) :105-113
URL: http://icssjournal.ir/article-1-1039-en.html
URL: http://icssjournal.ir/article-1-1039-en.html
1- PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies (ICSS), Tehran, Iran
2- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies (ICSS), Tehran, Iran
3- PhD of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies (ICSS), Tehran, Iran
2- Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies (ICSS), Tehran, Iran
3- PhD of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies (ICSS), Tehran, Iran
Abstract: (2492 Views)
Introduction: Physicalism is a view that believes that everything is physical and considers phenomenal consciousness as a physical phenomenon. The present study aims to show through the Zombie conceivability argument raised by Chalmers that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. As a result, it is a claim of false physicalism is false.
Method: This study is based on the study of the main and primary sources about this matter and has attempted to obtain some results about phenomenal consciousness through conceptual analysis, philosophical, and rational arguments.
Results: According to the zombie conceivability argument, a creature that is physically like a human but lacks phenomenal consciousness is conceivable. Accordingly if this creature is conceivable then it is possible, and the possibility of this creature shows that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. This argument first indicates by proposing the epistemological gap between physical and phenomenal realms that there is no epistemic entailment from physical facts to facts about phenomenal consciousness. Thus, one can be imagined without the other, and then it argues for a modal gap between the two realms, that is, there may be physical properties but no phenomenal consciousness. Finally, this gap argues for the ontological gap between the physical properties and the phenomenal consciousness and shows there is no ontological implication between the physical properties and the phenomenal consciousness, and the physical properties do not necessitate phenomenal consciousness.
Conclusion: Phenomenal consciousness and physical properties are ontologically independent. Phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon; therefore the claim of physicalism is false.
Method: This study is based on the study of the main and primary sources about this matter and has attempted to obtain some results about phenomenal consciousness through conceptual analysis, philosophical, and rational arguments.
Results: According to the zombie conceivability argument, a creature that is physically like a human but lacks phenomenal consciousness is conceivable. Accordingly if this creature is conceivable then it is possible, and the possibility of this creature shows that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. This argument first indicates by proposing the epistemological gap between physical and phenomenal realms that there is no epistemic entailment from physical facts to facts about phenomenal consciousness. Thus, one can be imagined without the other, and then it argues for a modal gap between the two realms, that is, there may be physical properties but no phenomenal consciousness. Finally, this gap argues for the ontological gap between the physical properties and the phenomenal consciousness and shows there is no ontological implication between the physical properties and the phenomenal consciousness, and the physical properties do not necessitate phenomenal consciousness.
Conclusion: Phenomenal consciousness and physical properties are ontologically independent. Phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon; therefore the claim of physicalism is false.
Type of Study: Research |
Received: 2019/11/13 | Accepted: 2020/09/6 | Published: 2020/10/1
Received: 2019/11/13 | Accepted: 2020/09/6 | Published: 2020/10/1
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