Talkhabi M, Zibakalam mofrad F. A Critique of Philosophical Assumptions of Bereiter’s Cognitive Approach Based on Hirst’s Theory. Advances in Cognitive Sciences 2011; 13 (3) :19-32
URL:
http://icssjournal.ir/article-1-360-en.html
1- Assistant Professor, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies (ICSS), Tehran, Iran.
2- Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract: (2911 Views)
Objective: The purpose of this study is to criticize the philosophical assumptions of C. Bereiter in the light of P. Hirst’s perspective.
Method: The nature of the research is ampliative critique in which Bereiter’s philosophical assumptions were restated and criticized.
Results: Findings show that Bereiter’s attempt to understand the mind has resulted in functionalism and pragmatism. He has demolished the dualism (what and how) of knowledge while talking about its several types. In fact, Bereiter intends to liberate knowledge from the mind, given that he does not accept that the quest for knowledge is an innate feature of the mind. To him, to be knowledgeable must be incited. In this way, although he extends the relationship between the mind and knowledge and also emphasizes the ability of the mind in building knowledge, he seems to ignore the role of structured knowledge in shaping the mind.
Conclusion: From his point of view, creation of knowledge-building culture is a necessity, even though people’s life satisfaction might be lost. However, he hopes that principled procedural knowledge would be a solution to cope with the barrier to the present theory-into-practice, whereas to solve the problem, the domain of practice and practical knowledge should be taken into account.
Type of Study:
Research |
Subject:
Special Received: 2011/05/22 | Accepted: 2011/07/23 | Published: 2011/09/23