Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:

---

Motivation in general and moral motivation, in particular, has been highly-discussed subject among psychologists and philosophers. The question of what mental states necessarily lead to moral behaviors has received various answers. Motivational internalists about moral judgement have argued that moral judgements necessitate moral behaviors. Among them, sensationalists take moral judgements to be expressions of emotions, whereas internalists about moral beliefs entertain the thought that moral judgements are expressions of moral beliefs. On the contrary, motivational externalists about moral beliefs speak of the conceivability of an individual who has a moral belief but due to a lack of desire to act morally, individual is not motivated to act upon her/his belief (the case of amoralist). Furthermore, motivational internalists hold that amoralism is more than a mere intellectual possibility; they take the case of “psychopathy” as a realization of this abstract possibility. They claim that empirical findings of Blair’s studies on psychopath prisoners provide counter-evidence to the externalist thought that psychopaths are threats to internalism. Among advocates of motivational internalism, Sinnott-Armstrong has used Blair’s empirical findings along with a philosophical argument (argument from an analogy between morality and art) to establish that psychopathy is not a threat to internalism. The present study is an attempt to reveal that (a) Sinnott- Armstrong’s argument is not effective, and (b) motivational internalism relies on a false premise.

Keywords: Motivational internalism, Motivational externalism, Psychopathy, Morality, Blair, Sinnott-Armstrong

Full-Text [PDF 1550 kb]   (720 Downloads)    

Add your comments about this article : Your username or Email:

---